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Abstract 
 
Christine Korsgaard claims that Gewirth’s argument for morality fails to demonstrate that 
there is a categorically binding principle on action because it operates with the assumption 
that reasons for action are essentially private. This attribution is unfounded and Korsgaard’s 
own argument for moral obligation, in its appeal to Wittgenstein’s Private Language 
Argument to establish that reasons for action are essentially public, is misdirected and 
unnecessary.  Gewirth’s attempt to demonstrate a strictly a priori connection between a moral 
principle and the concept of being an agent as such is essentially Kantian, and recognizing 
that the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives is categorically binding requires Kantians to 
accept that Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency is the supreme practical principle.   
 
Introduction 
 
Morality is commonly characterized as a system of rules governed by a categorically binding 
impartial imperative. As Kant claims, a categorical imperative ‘must already be connected 
(completely a priori) with the concept of the will of a rational being as such’.1 Such an 
imperative will, however, be impartial only if the following principle of universalisation 
(FPU) is analytic: 
 
If an agent
2
 (Albert) is categorically bound to act in accord with a maxim M then 
every other agent (e.g., Brenda) is categorically bound to act in accord with what M 
prescribes to Albert.     
 
Kant maintains that 
 
[t]he human being necessarily represents his own existence  [as an end in itself]; so 
far it is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being also 
represents his existence in this way consequent on just the same rational ground that 
also holds for me; thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a 
supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. The 
practical imperative will therefore be the following: So act that you use humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as 
an end, never merely as a means.
3
  
 
In other words, Albert is bound to act in accord with Ma: ‘Treat Albert’s existence as an end 
in itself’, because Ma is connected completely a priori to Albert’s concept of himself as an 
agent. Consequently, not only is Brenda bound to act in accord with Mb: ‘Treat Brenda’s 
existence as an end in itself’, because ‘Mb is connected completely a priori to Brenda’s 
                                                          
1
 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, [1785] 1998), 4:426. 
2
 A being who pursues purposes it regards as reasons for so doing. 
3
 Kant, Groundwork 4:429. 
concept of herself as an agent, Albert is also bound to act in accord with Mb and Brenda is 
also bound to act in accord with Ma. 
 
So, Kant’s argument for morality has two stages. Per Stage I, there is an imperative that is a 
subjective principle of human actions, a maxim that Albert must accept that Albert must 
follow. Per Stage II, such a maxim is also an objective principle of human actions, one that 
Brenda also must treat as a subjective principle for her actions, which is to say that Stage II 
tries to show that the FPU is analytic.    
 
Alan Gewirth’s argument4 that the supreme practical principle is the Principle of Generic 
Consistency (PGC)‘Act in accord with the generic rights5 of all agents’follows this two-
stage pattern.  Per Stage A, it is ‘dialectically necessary’6 for Albert to consider that he has 
the generic rights. Hence (Stage B) it follows purely logically that it is dialectically necessary 
for Albert to recognize that Brenda also has the generic rights. 
 
Because the Kantian and Gewirthian arguments for morality share this structure, differences 
between them can only stem from differences between ‘considering humanity in one’s person 
to be an end in itself’ and ‘considering that one has the generic rights’ and/or a normative 
principle being connected completely a priori with Albert’s concept of himself as an agent vs. 
a normative principle being dialectically necessary for Albert. 
 
Christine Korsgaard portrays Gewirth as maintaining  
 
that you are rationally committed … to valuing certain features of yourself … [so] … 
you must value the same features in … [others] … on pain of contradiction. Since I 
must regard my humanity as a source of value, I must in the name of consistency 
regard your humanity that way as well. So I must value the things that you value. Or, 
to put it another way since I think that my humanity is what makes my desires into 
normative reasons, I must on pain of contradiction suppose that the humanity of 
others makes their desires into normative reasons as well.
7
  
 
However, while  
 
                                                          
4
 Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
5
These are rights to the generic conditions of agency (GCAs), which are conditions needed to be able to act at all 
or with any general chances of success, regardless of one’s purposes. They include life itself, health, and the 
means to these such as food, clothing and shelter, freedom of action, mental equilibrium sufficient to be able to 
translate wishes into behaviour, and accurate information (see Gewirth, Reason and Morality, pp. 53-63). A 
condition is generic if lack of it (either immediately or if prolonged) will have some negative effect on one’s 
ability to act at all or to act successfully, regardless of one’s purposes.    
6
Something is dialectically necessary for me if I must assent to it on pain of failing to understand what it is for 
me to be an agent (hence implicitly denying that I am an agent).  ‘It is dialectically necessary for me to do Z’ is 
not equivalent to ‘I necessarily do Z’. The latter implies that I cannot be an agent and not do Z. The former 
states that I ought to do Z on pain of denying that I am  an agent, which implies that I can be an agent and not do 
Z    
7
 Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 133. To 
be precise, she says that ‘Gewirth, for instance makes an argument that looks like this in Reason and Morality’ 
(ibid.) 
 [c]onsistency  can force me to acknowledge that your desires have the status of 
reasons for you, in exactly the same way that mine do for me it does not force me 
to share in your reasons, or make your humanity normative for me.
8
 
 
This is because Gewirth tries to show that private reasons with normative force for an agent 
give the agent some reason to take the private reasons of other agents into account by arguing 
that the agent’s private reasons ‘logically commit her to taking other people’s reasons into 
account   starting from the assumption that reasons for action are private’9. But on this 
assumption, even if consistency would 
 
force me to take your reasons into account  it would do it in the wrong way. It 
would show that I have an obligation to myself to treat you in ways that respect the 
value which I place on you. It would show that I have duties with respect to you, 
about you, but not that there are things that I owe to you.
10
 
 
However, ‘reasons are not private, but public in their very essence’.11  But once it is 
established that reasons are essentially public 
 
it will be easy to show how we can get someone who acknowledges the value of his 
own humanity to see that he has moral obligations.
12
 
 
To show that reasons are essentially public, Korsgaard appeals to Wittgenstein’s argument 
that it is impossible for one to have a language that is in principle incommunicable to 
anybody else, which she claims shows that 
 
[t]o talk about values and meanings is to talk … about relations we have with 
ourselves and one another. The normative demands of meaning and reason are … 
demands that we make on ourselves and each other.
13
 
 
So, if I hear sounds uttered by you as words, 
 
I acknowledge that you are someone. In acknowledging that I can hear them, I 
acknowledge that I am someone.
14
  
 
This gets us to moral obligation in the following way. 
 
                                                          
8
Korsgaard, Sources, p. 134. She attributes this objection to Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), Chapter 4, but neglects to say that Williams addresses an argument that 
|he himself constructs, which he says ‘is similar in several respects to that offered by Gewirth’, while 
acknowledging that Gewirth’s argument ‘differs in some respects from that considered here’ (ibid. p. 218 n.2). 
Williams says that he thinks that Gewirth’s own argument fails for the same general reasons, but he does not tell 
us what modifications he has made. 
9
 Korsgaard, Sources, p.  134. 
10
 Korsgaard, Sources , p.  134. 
11
 Korsgaard, Sources, pp.  134-135. She explains that ‘if … reasons were essentially private, it would be 
impossible to exchange or to share them’, while if they are essentially public ‘their privacy must be incidental or 
ephemeral; they must be inherently shareable’ (p. 135). 
12
 Korsgaard, Sources, p.  136. 
13
 Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, p.  138. 
14
 Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, p. 143. 
Suppose that we are strangers and that you are tormenting me, and suppose that I call 
upon you to stop. I say: ‘How would you like it if someone did that to you?’ … 
[Recognizing that I am someone, you would] … realize that you would not merely 
dislike it, you would resent it. You would think that the other has a reason to stop, 
more, that he has an obligation to stop. And that obligation would spring from your 
own objection to what he does to you. You make yourself an end for others; you make 
yourself a law to them. But if you are a law to others in so far as you are just human, 
just someone, then the humanity of others is also a law for you. By making you think 
these thoughts, I force you to acknowledge the value of my humanity, and I obligate 
you to act in a way that respects it.
15
 
 
In response, I argue that Korsgaard’s claims about the deficiencies of the Gewirthian 
argument are unfounded because the argument she attacks is a straw man; that her own 
argument for moral obligation is misdirected and unnecessary; that the a priori nature of the 
Gewirthian argument is essentially Kantian; and that because Kantians recognize that the 
Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives is categorically binding they must accept Gewirth’s 
PGC as the supreme practical principle.   
 
Korsgaard provides no evidence for her characterization of the Gewirthian argument. So, 
because she claims to derive her objection from her understanding of Williams, in Part One, I 
examine Williams’ critique of the argument he constructs from Gewirth and agree that it is 
sound. However, Williams does not address the Gewirthian argument. 
 
So, in Part Two, I outline my own reconstruction,
16
 which Gewirth endorsed.
17
 The argument 
is valid if, and only if, the formal moral principle (FMP) (a corollary of the FPUthe FPU 
being equivalent to ‘It is dialectically necessary for agents to treat the dialectically necessary 
normative commitments of any agent as their own’) 
 
Act in accord with the dialectically necessary normative commitments of all agents, 
 
and the Principle of Instrumental Reason or Hypothetical Imperatives (PHI), 
 
If doing X (or having) Y is necessary for Albert to pursue/achieve a goal E, then 
Albert ought to do X (or act to obtain Y) or give up pursuit of E, 
 
are both dialectically necessary for Albert, and I argue that they are. 
 
In Part Three, I translate this into Korsgaard’s terms. The Gewirthian argument does not 
contend that Albert’s private reasons ‘logically commit [him] to taking other people’s reasons 
into account   starting from the assumption that reasons for action are private’. It presumes 
neither that reasons for action are necessarily private nor that they are necessarily public, but 
demonstrates that dialectically necessary normative commitments, those that are categorically 
binding on agents (and only such commitments) provide necessarily public reasons for action. 
Consistency with the idea that Albert is an agent as such requires him to treat Brenda’s 
dialectically normative commitments as his own. It follows from the nature of the argument 
for this (for the FMP) that Albert’s duty not to interfere with Brenda’s possession of the 
                                                          
15
 Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, p.  143. 
16
 Deryck Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defense of Alan Gewirth’s 
Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
17
 See Alan Gewirth, ‘Foreword’ in Deryck Beyleveld, Dialectical Necessity of Morality, pp. vii-xvii. 
GCAs is a duty he owes to the particular agent that Brenda is for the reason that she, just like 
Albert, possesses agency (humanity in Korsgaard’s terms) in her person.  
 
In Part Four, I contend that Korsgaard’s argument for Stage II of the Kantian project is not an 
argument for moral obligation at all. What it addresses is why Albert must treat Brenda as 
being human (an agent) if she behaves like an agent. If  Korsgaard’s own argument for Stage 
I establishes that Albert must consider that the reason why he is a law to Brenda is simply 
that he is an agent, then nothing more is needed to establish that Albert must consider Brenda 
to be a law to him. This follows purely logically, Williams agrees, and Korsgaard’s argument 
for Stage II presupposes that this is so.  
 
In Part Five, I argue that the Kantian argument for Stage I is sound only if understood in 
Gewirthian terms, and Kantians cannot maintain (as they do) that the PHI is an aspect of the 
categorical imperative and not accept that the PGC is the categorical imperative. 
 
I conclude that, in attempting to demonstrate a strictly priori connection between morality 
and the concept of agency as such, the Gewirthian project is essentially Kantian, but that it is 
only true that Albert must, in these terms, consider that humanity/agency in his person is an 
end in itself if this means that he must consider that he has the generic rights. 
 
Part One: Williams’ Objection to ‘Gewirth’ 
 
Williams constructs the following argument. 
 
 Since I necessarily want my basic freedom,
18
 I must be opposed to courses of action 
that would remove it. Hence I cannot agree to any arrangement of things by which 
others would have the right to remove my basic freedom. So, when I reflect on what 
arrangement of things I basically need, I see that I must claim a right to my basic 
freedom. In effect, I must lay it down as a rule that they respect my freedom. I claim 
this right solely because I am a rational agent with purposes. But if this fact alone is 
the basis of my claim, then a similar fact must equally be the basis of such a claim by 
others. … In moving from my need for freedom to ‘they ought not to interfere with 
me’, I must equally move from their need to ‘I ought not to interfere with them’.19  
 
He claims that the 
 
very last stepthat if in my case rational agency alone is the ground of the right of 
non-interference, then it must be so in the case of other peopleis certainly sound … 
[It] is brought into play simply by because or in virtue of … . That must be so if 
enough is indeed enough.
20
 
  
So, if the argument goes wrong it must be at an earlier stepwhich is ‘when I first assert my 
supposed right’.21 The mistake is to hold that ‘I must be opposed to courses of action that 
would remove my basic freedom because I necessarily want/need basic freedom’ entails ‘I 
must consider that I have a right to my basic freedom’. 
 
                                                          
18He restricts his discussion to ‘basic freedom’.    
19
 Williams, Ethics, pp. 59-60. 
20
 Williams, Ethics, p. 60. 
21
 Williams, Ethics, p. 60. 
He reasons as follows. That I (Albert) necessarily want basic freedom or need it for whatever 
purposes I want to pursue does provide me with a categorically binding reason to oppose 
interference with my basic freedom; but it does not provide me with a categorically binding 
reason to oppose interference with Brenda’s basic freedom. For it to do so, I must necessarily 
want Brenda to have basic freedom or necessarily need her to have it for my chosen purposes. 
But I do not necessarily want or need Brenda to have basic freedom. Of course, Brenda also 
has a categorically binding reason to oppose interference with her basic freedom. However, 
my wants or needs ‘are not necessarily reasons for another’s doing anything’22 and vice 
versa. 
 
Williams is not saying that it is unintelligible for me to ‘prescribe’ to Brenda (on the grounds 
that I necessarily want basic freedom, or categorically need it) that she ought not to interfere 
with my basic freedom. Indeed, he says that this ‘prescription’ is ‘reasonably related’ to me.23 
His contention is that if this is my justification for my rights claim, then this justification will 
only require me to grant Brenda a right to basic freedom if  (which is not the case) I 
necessarily want her to have basic freedom or categorically need her to have it for what I 
want.   
 
He adds that if I must consider that I have a right to basic freedom on such grounds,  I should 
also prescribe that I have a right to all my particular purposes, because I want to achieve them 
‘as much as anything else   [and]  my need for basic freedom was itself derived from that 
kind of want’.24 Furthermore, it is unsound to infer from the true statement that I may not 
grant others a right to interfere with my basic freedom that I must consider that I have a right 
to basic freedom, because I might refuse to make claims about anyone’s rights in relation to 
my having basic freedom.
25
   
 
All of this is sound; but Williams’ construction is not the Gewirthian argument! 
 
Part Two: The Gewirthian Argument 
 
Albert, as an agent, does something (X) voluntarily in order to pursue some purpose (or 
purposes) E that he chooses to pursue. The argument proceeds from Albert’s internal 
viewpoint through the following steps: 
 
(1) In choosing to do X for E, I (Albert) necessarily care about E enough to move me to 
do something to bring about E = I necessarily proactively want E = I necessarily 
attach a value to E sufficient to motivate me to pursue E.       
(2) ‘If doing X (or having Y) is necessary for me to pursue or achieve E then I ought to 
do X (or I ought to act to ensure that I obtain or keep Y), or give up my pursuit of E’. 
This is the Principle of Instrumental Reason or Hypothetical Imperatives (PHI). 
(3) It is dialectically necessary for me to accept the PHI: otherwise I fail to understand 
that as an agent I am trying to achieve E voluntarily by doing X.
26
 
(4) ‘If Y is a GCA, then it is dialectically necessary for me to accept ‘I ought to want to 
have Y proactively, for my purposes, whatever they might be’. This entails that it is 
                                                          
22
 Williams, Ethics, p. 61. This is to say that they are not necessarily public, rather than that they are necessarily 
private. 
23
 See Williams, Ethics, pp. 60-61. 
24
 Williams, Ethics, p. 62. 
25
 Williams, Ethics, p. 62. 
26
 Kantians, see Part Five, below, accept this, so I will not elaborate here. 
dialectically necessary for me to accept the self-referring prescription, SROa, ‘I ought 
to defend my having the GCAs, for my purposes, whatever they might be’. SROa can 
be expressed in a number of equivalent ways; e.g., ‘I categorically instrumentally 
ought to defend my having the GCAs’ = ‘I ought to defend my having the GCAs, 
unless (and only unless) I am willing to suffer generic damage to my ability to act’27  
= ‘I ought to oppose unwilled interference with my having the GCAs’ = ‘I ought to 
oppose interference with my having the GCAs, unless (and only unless) interference 
is not against my will’. I will formulate the statement that SROa is dialectically 
necessary for me (Albert) as {SROa}Albert.
28
 
 (5) Because I generically need the GCAs to achieve any end, I will not be able to defend 
having them if Brenda prevents me from having them. Therefore,  {SROa}Albert  
{Brenda ought not to interfere with my having the GCAs against my will}Albert = 
{BRO}Albert  {I have a right to non-interference with my having the GCAs}Albert = 
{AR}Albert.
29
 
 
This concludes Stage A of the argument. 
 
(6) By the Argument from the Sufficiency of Agency (ASA)
30
, {AR}Albert  {I am an 
agent  AR}Albert.
31
 
 
The ASA runs as follows: 
 
 In order for me to deny ‘I am an agent ( I possess agency in my person)  AR’, I 
must assert ‘AR  I have D’, where D is a property I do not, as an agent, necessarily 
have, by which I contend, ‘If I do not (or did not) have D then I do not (or would not) 
have the generic rights’. But given {AR}Albert, I implicitly deny that I am an agent if I 
deny AR. It follows that I deny that I am an agent if I assert, ‘AR  I have D’. In 
order not to deny that I am an agent, I must deny ’AR  I have D’, which means that 
I must accept ‘I am an agent  AR’. Therefore, {AR}Albert  {I am an agent  
AR}Albert. 
  
(7) By the logical principle of universalization (LPU)
32
 operating on ‘I am an agent  
AR’ within ‘{AR}Albert  {I am an agent  AR}Albert’, {Brenda is an agent  I 
                                                          
27
 This condition is expressed this way because not all GCAs are necessary for the very possibility of action. 
Some are necessary only for general chances of successful action. And even the former are subject to having 
degrees of impact in the sense that their absence may have more or less immediate effects on the possibility of 
action.   
28
 A proposition in face brackets is dialectically necessary, the subscript indicating for whom it is dialectically 
necessary. 
29
 The generic rights are argued to be positive as well as negative; i.e., they are argued to be rights to assistance 
as well as rights to non-interference. For convenience, I shall, in the main, only follow the track of the claims as 
claims to negative rights. The claims as positive rights are not derived from the claims to negative rights, but are 
parallel to them: I need assistance to secure my having the GCAs when I cannot do so by my own unaided 
efforts as much as I need non-interference. (See Gewirth, Reason and Morality, pp. 228-229.)  
30
 See Gewirth, Reason and Morality, p, 110. 
31
 What the ASA purports to show is that if my being an agent is my dialectically necessary ratio cognoscendi 
for my claim to have AR then it is dialectically necessary for me to accept that it is also the ratio essendi for my 
having AR. 
32
 This may be stated as ‘If the fact that A has  is sufficient to infer that A has , then the fact that B has  is 
sufficient to infer that  B has ’. The principle depends merely on the meaning of ‘sufficient to infer’. In its 
application here, ‘having ’ is ‘being an agent’; and ‘having ’ is ‘having the generic rights’. 
ought not to interfere with Brenda’s having the GCAs, unless she is willing to suffer 
generic damage to her ability to act}Albert  {Brenda has a right to non-interference 
with her GCAs}Albert  
(8) By the LPU, {All agents have a right to non-interference with their having the 
GCAs)all agents = {The PGC}all agents 
 
This concludes Stage B of the argument. 
 
Stage A provides Albert with two reasons for opposing interference with his having the 
GCAs (for acting in accordance with SROa). One reason is that he categorically 
instrumentally needs the GCAs in order to pursue/achieve his chosen purposes. Williams and 
Korsgaard portray Albert as reasoning solely in terms of this reason. In effect, they interpret 
the Gewirthian claim that SROa is dialectically necessary for Albert as the claim that Albert 
categorically instrumentally (for his purposes) ought to defend his having the GCAs. But this 
is not the Gewirthian claim, which is the thoroughly Kantian one that Albert fails to 
understand what it is for him to be an agent (to possess agency in his person) if he does not 
agree that he ought to structure his practical reasoning in accordance with the PHI, and hence 
with SROa. 
 
So, it is irrelevant to the validity of the Gewirthian argument that Albert does not necessarily 
want Brenda to pursue/achieve her chosen purposes or that he does not categorically need her 
to have the GCAs in order to achieve his chosen purposes. It must be shown that {SROa}Albert 
does not entail {BR}Albert.  
 
According to the sequence I have outlined, {SROa}Albert {BRO  AR}Albert.  
 {I (Albert) am an agent  BRO/AR}Albert. {Brenda is an agent  BR}Albert  
{BR}Albert.   
 
Williams cannot question consistently that {I (Albert) am an agent  AR}Albert  {BR}Albert, 
because he says that ‘I (Albert) am an agent  AR’ entails ‘BR (if Brenda is an agent)’. And 
he is not concerned to deny that the PHI is dialectically necessary for Albert (which would be 
tantamount to denying that there are any reasons for action at all); and {PHI}Albert   
{SROa}Albert. So, the critical step for Williams is from {SROa}Albert to {AR}Albert. 
 
There is no need to examine here all the ways in which this step has been attacked and can be 
defended. This is because it is not necessary to employ this step to demonstrate {BR}Albert.  
 
The fact of the matter is that the Gewirthian argument rests on nothing more and nothing less 
than coupling {PHI}Albert (which, conjoined with the idea of a GCA, yields {SROa}Albert) with 
the dialectical necessity of the FMP (‘Act in accord with the dialectically necessary 
normative commitments of all agents’). 
 
So, assuming {PHI}Albert, all that needs to be established is {FMP}Albert. 
 
Of course, if the Gewirthian sequence outlined is sound then {FMP}Albert follows by 
implication. But {FMP}Albert can also be established by showing that {SROa}Albert  
{BR}Albert  without first showing that {SROa}Albert  {AR}Albert,  (which again establishes 
{FMP}Albert by implication), or by inferring it directly from the idea that Albert is able to 
understand the idea of a maxim being dialectically necessary for him. 
 
The direct argument for {SROa}Albert  {BR}Albert, runs as follows.
33
 
 
{SROa}Albert  {Albert is an agent  SROa}Albert. This is because, in order for Albert to 
deny ‘Albert is an agent  SROa’, he must assert ‘SROa  Albert has D’ (where D is a 
property he does not, as an agent, necessarily have), by which he contends, ‘If I do not (or did 
not) have D then I do not (or would not) be bound by SROa’. But given {SROa}Albert, Albert 
implicitly denies that he is an agent if he rejects SROa. It follows that Albert denies that he is 
an agent if he asserts, ‘SROa  Albert has D’. In order not to deny that he is an agent, Albert 
must reject ’SROa  Albert has D’, which means that he must accept ‘Albert is an agent  
SROa’. Therefore, {SROa}Albert  {Albert is an agent  SROa}Albert.. This, of course, is 
exactly the same form of reasoning employed in the ASA (see step [6] in my Gewirthian 
sequence).  
 
By parallel reasoning, {SROb}Brenda,, which entails {Brenda is an agent  SROb}Brenda. 
 
But it is dialectically necessary for Albert to accept this. So, {SROa}Albert   
{{SROb}Brenda}Albert. But, again, by the reasoning involved in the ASA, this entails {Albert is 
an agent  {SROb}Brenda}Albert. Similarly, this entails {Albert is an agent  {Brenda is an 
agent  SROb}Brenda}Albert. So, Albert must consider that the reason why Brenda must 
consider that agency in her person is the supreme authority over what she may or may not do 
in relation to disposal of her person (which is the significance of {SROb}Brenda for Brenda) is 
that Albert is an agent. So, it is dialectically necessary for Albert to consider that agency in 
his person is the legislative authority that makes it dialectically necessary for Brenda to 
consider that agency in her person is the legislative authority that delegates to her will 
supreme authority over what she may or may not do in relation to disposal of her person.  
Therefore, it is dialectically necessary for Albert to hold that the reason why he must accept 
SROa and the reason why Brenda must accept SROb is the same legislative reason, which is 
that Albert is an agent. But if Albert must hold that it is agency in Albert’s person that 
requires Brenda to hold that her will is the supreme authority over her disposal of her person, 
then Albert must accept that Brenda’s will is the supreme authority over her disposal of her 
person. And this is to say that it is dialectically necessary for Albert to grant Brenda the 
generic rights.  
 
Ergo, {SROa}Albert  {BR}Albert, and consequently {FMP}Albert, 
 
To derive {FMP}Albert from the idea that Albert is capable of understanding the idea of a 
maxim being dialectically necessary for him, it must be shown that if a maxim Ma is 
dialectically necessary for Albert, then {Ma}Albert  {Mb}Albert, where Mb is the parallel 
maxim that would be dialectically necessary for Brenda. The argument applies the same form 
of reasoning involved in the argument I have just provided. 
 
By the reasoning involved in the ASA, {Ma}Albert  {I (Albert) am an agent  Ma}Albert,  By 
parallel reasoning, {Brenda is an agent  Mb}Brenda.  So, {Ma}Albert   {{Mb}Brenda}Albert. But 
this entails {Albert is an agent  {Mb}Brenda}Albert. Similarly, this entails {Albert is an agent 
 {Brenda is an agent  Mb}Brenda}Albert. So, Albert must consider that the reason why 
Brenda must consider that her being an agent is the reason why she must comply with Mb is 
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that Albert is an agent. So, it is dialectically necessary for Albert to consider that his being an 
agent is the reason why it dialectically necessary for Brenda to consider that her being an 
agent is the reason why she must comply with Mb.  Therefore, it is dialectically necessary for 
Albert to hold that the reason why he must comply with Ma and the reason why Brenda must 
comply with Mb is the same legislative reason, which is that Albert is an agent. But if Albert 
must hold that it is because Albert is an agent that Brenda must comply with Mb, then Albert 
must accept that he must act in accord with Mb.  
 
Ergo, {Ma}Albert  {Mb}Albert, which is to say, {FMP}Albert, 
 
This conclusion might be challenged by claiming that what is attributed to Albert in the ASA 
when he considers that he is an agent is not the same as what is attributed to Brenda when (he 
or she) considers that Brenda is an agent, or that if it is the same then it is not something that 
gives Albert and Brenda any reason to act if they are real agents. 
 
The first challenge claims that ‘Albert is an agent’ means ‘Albert is a member of the class of 
beings who necessarily value the purposes Albert has chosen’, whereas ‘Brenda is an agent’ 
means ‘Brenda is a member of the class of beings who necessarily value the purposes Brenda 
has chosen’. However, each of these classes necessarily has only one member. Consequently, 
my arguments for {FMP}Albert fail, because in these terms {Ma}Albert does not entail 
{Mb}Brenda. From Albert’s dialectically necessary point of view, he is the only possible agent 
(as is Brenda from her dialectically necessary point of view).
34
 
 
The second challenge claims that what is ascribed in ‘Albert is an agent’ and ‘Brenda is an 
agent’ is only the same if to think of Albert and Brenda as agents is to think of them as beings 
lacking any of the particular characteristics that make them the particular agents that they are. 
As such, while the FMP is dialectically necessary for Albert and Brenda thought of as 
‘rational agents and no more’, there is no way ‘of being a rational agent and no more’,35 so 
this fact does not provide either Brenda or Albert (if they are real agents) with any reasons to 
act.  
 
Both of these challenges fail because the following principle of reflective judgment (PRJ) is 
analytic from Albert’s internal perspective as a real agent. 
 
If Albert thinks of himself as the unique being who necessarily values his own chosen 
purposes (as the particular agent that he is) then he must also think of himself as a 
member of the class of beings who stand in the universal relation to their own chosen 
purposes of necessarily valuing them (as a member of the generic class of agents); 
and, conversely, if he thinks of himself as a member of the generic class of agents, 
then he must also think of himself as the particular agent that he is. 
 
In essence, Williams alleges that the Kantian-Gewirthian project of trying to justify a 
categorically binding impartial principle falls prey to a dilemma: either it can justify 
categorically binding requirements for real agents at the price of making them not 
universalisable (alleged Gewirthian route) or it can justify impartial requirements that are 
categorically binding only on complete abstractions (alleged Kantian route). 
 
                                                          
34
 This objection amounts to claiming that reasons for action are essentially private, and this claim rests on the 
proposition that it is not intelligible for Albert to even imagine that there might be agents other than himself. 
35
 Williams, Ethics, p. 63. 
However, the Gewirthian argument does not fall prey to this dilemma, because the dilemma 
does not exist. Albert, as the subject of Gewirthian self-reflection, is neither a pure 
abstraction nor a being who considers himself the only conceivable addressor and addressee 
of practical precepts (neither of which construction is intelligible). He is someone whose self-
reflective awareness as an agent is governed by the PRJ.
36
   
 
Part Three: Private and Public Reasons in the Gewirthian Argument 
 
As Korsgaard defines an essentially private reason for action, her allegation that the 
Gewirthian argument operates with the presumption that reasons for action are essentially 
private has no foundation. The idea that reasons for action are essentially private renders it 
incoherent to hold, not merely that one agent categorically ought to act for any interests of 
another, but that it is even possible for one agent to act for any interests of another. Were 
Gewirthians to make such an assumption, it would be absurd for them to attempt to show, on 
any grounds whatsoever, that rationality requires agents to take account of any interests of 
others in deciding how they themselves may act. 
 
This, however, does not mean that Gewirthians suppose that reasons for action are essentially 
public (if an essentially public reason is a necessarily public one), for they do not suppose, 
nor do they try to show, that every reason for Albert to act is necessarily a reason that Brenda 
must act in accordance with and vice versa.
37
 What they do suppose is that any reasons for 
action are capable of being treated as public (hence, are not essentially private). This requires 
only that it be intelligible to imagine that agents are capable of acting for the purposes of 
others, that agents who have moral, even altruistic, motivations might conceivably exist.  
 
Gewirthians follow Kant unequivocally in holding that if a maxim is to be shown to be 
categorically binding on Albert then the requirement to act on it must be shown to be 
connected completely a priori with Albert’s idea of himself as an agent, which they interpret 
to mean that it must be shown that Albert fails to understand what it is for him to be an agent 
if he does not accept that he ought to act according to the maxim in question. Consequently, 
the criterion for the Gewirthian dialectically necessary method (CDNM) is 
 
I (Albert) may and must accept a maxim if (and only if) my failure to accept it entails 
that I fail to understand what it is for me to an agent.  
 
The CDNM, which is analytically connected to the idea of a categorical imperative, must be 
distinguished from the fundamental Gewirthian criterion for normatively rational action 
(GCRA), which is 
 
I (Albert) categorically ought to act on any maxim Ma that is dialectically necessary 
for me to adopt, and it is not impermissible for me to act on a maxim N only if N is 
consistent with Ma.  
 
The CDNM does not prohibit Albert, as a rational agent, from acting on maxims that are not 
dialectically necessary for him. It only prohibits him from appealing to any considerations 
that are not dialectically necessary for him as premises in the sequence of reasoning  
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purporting to establish a dialectically necessary conclusion for him (either to support or to 
undermine an inference). So, by the GCRA, unless (and until) some maxims are shown to be 
dialectically necessary for Albert (with which all rationally permissible maxims for Albert 
must be consistent), Albert is permitted to adopt any self-coherent maxims for possible 
actions. He is not, therefore, at the outset, prohibited from adopting, as a matter of contingent 
commitment, either altruistic or egoistic maxims, moral maxims or amoral maxims.
38
    
 
On this basis, Gewirthians argue that dialectically necessary reasons (and only dialectically 
necessary reasons) for action are necessarily public. They do so, as I have shown, by arguing 
(using the ASA and the PRJ) that the FMP is dialectically necessary for Albert. Then, the fact 
that the PHI is dialectically necessary for Albert entails that he can only have (contingently) 
private reasons for action (ones serving his contingently chosen purposes) if there are some 
necessarily public reasons for action. Contingently private reasons must obey the PHI, which 
agents must comply with for an essentially public reason, to be able to think coherently that 
they are agents (that they have the capacity to do X voluntarily for an E that they have 
chosen). 
 
The dialectically necessary (essentially public) commitments of agents, so justified, are 
strictly limited. When the argument reaches its conclusion, the only substantive dialectically 
necessary commitment that Albert and Brenda have is to defend their own and each other’s 
possession of the GCAs from interference that is unwilled by the one whose possession of the 
GCAs is under threat. Albert is, therefore, completely free to decline to defend his possession 
of the GCAs or to invite interference by Brenda, provided only that he is willing to suffer 
generic damage to his ability to act and this does not lead to interference with other agents’ 
(e.g., Carole’s) having the GCAs against Carole’s will. Similarly, Albert may choose to live 
his life according to a normative world-view of his own (a personal ‘practical identity’ to use 
Korsgaard’s expression)39 or one that he contingently shares with others that he takes to 
impose obligations on him that trump for him all considerations affecting his own welfare. 
This is consistent with the absolutely overriding nature of the PGC, because the PGC permits 
Albert to do anything at all provided only that this does not interfere with agents having the 
GCAs against their will.
40
 
 
Korsgaard alleges that if the Gewirthian argument establishes that Albert must accept duties 
in relation to Brenda, these will not be duties to Brenda. This is false.  By the ASA 
(interpreted in the light of the PRJ), Albert must accept that he has a duty not to interfere with 
Brenda’s possession of the GCAs because she is an agent (possesses agency in her person). 
To be sure, he must think that he owes this duty to agency in Brenda’s person because he 
possesses agency in his own person. But there is no difference between agency in his person 
and agency in Brenda’s person. A duty Albert must accept if he is to think coherently that he 
possesses agency in his person is not a duty Albert must accept for the sake of the 
characteristics that make him the particular agent that he is. It is a duty he must accept in 
order to think that he has those characteristics that also make Brenda an agent (an intelligible 
addressor and addressee of practical precepts). Since it is only because he has these qualities 
that he can conceive of himself as the particular agent that he is, the force of what he (the 
particular agent that he is) must accept in order to conceive of himself as an agent can, in no 
way, be subject to whatever makes him the particular agent that he is, but is nevertheless 
binding on him as the particular agent that he is. 
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 Furthermore, because {BR}Albert is the universalization (via the ASA) of {SROa}Albert and 
SROa requires Albert to defend his possession of the GCAs only if he wills to act, the duty 
that Albert must accept he has to Brenda consequent upon {BR}Albert is one that Brenda can 
release him from by exercise of her will. This entails that the duty Albert owes is a duty to the 
particular agent that Brenda is. 
 
In short, the duty Albert owes in relation to Brenda he owes to the particular agent that 
Brenda is on account of his and her possession of agency in their persons. 
 
Part Four: Korsgaard’s Argument for Morality 
 
This conclusion does not rely on any appeal of the kind Korsgaard makes to Wittgenstein. 
The rationally necessitated move to moral obligation requires nothing beyond Albert’s self-
understanding of what it is for him to be an agent (i.e., a particular agent). So, how does 
Korsgaard’s ‘argument for moral obligation’ fit into this picture?  
 
The argument she presents has the following form: 
. 
(a) You make yourself a law to others (hence, you consider that others have an obligation 
not to torment you).
41
 
(b) You consider that the reason you are a law to others is simply because you are human. 
(c) Therefore you must concede that they are a law to you if they are human. 
(d) If you hear my call to you to stop tormenting me as an objection to your action then 
you must recognize that I am human. 
(e) Therefore you must concede that I am a law to you (and recognize an obligation not to 
torment me when I object). 
 
She appeals to Wittgenstein exclusively to justify (d). She does not appeal to Wittgenstein to 
justify (a) or (b) (which her argument for Stage I is presumed to have done),
42
 and (c) follows 
purely logically from (b) (just as Korsgaard supposes it does here). But the sequence ‘(a), (b), 
therefore (c)’ is identical in form to: 
 
(A) You consider that you have the generic rights (hence, consider that others have an 
obligation not to torment you, if tormenting you is interference with your having the 
GCAs). 
(B) You consider that the reason that you have the generic rights is simply because you 
are an agent. 
(C) Therefore you must concede that I have the generic rights if I am an agent. 
  
What justifies morality in these sequences is (b)/(B), the proposition that humanity/agency is 
the ratio essendi for being a law to others/having the generic rights.
43
 The way in which she 
uses Wittgenstein is neither able nor needed to establish that. 
 
Korsgaard’s appeal to Wittgenstein addresses a totally different problem. This is that even if 
you must assent to (a)-(c)/(A)-(C), for you to have to accept (d)/(D) (and therefore (e)/(E)) 
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you must have to recognize that I am ‘someone’ (i.e., human/an agent). This problem arises 
in applying the moral law, not in establishing it.  
   
Suppose that you accept that it is dialectically necessary for you to treat agents as a law to 
you. Nevertheless, when you interact with me, you fail to respect my humanity. When I 
object, you do not deny that agents are a law to you and that you are categorically bound to 
respect their humanity. What you claim is that, even though I behave like an agent, you do 
not know for certain that I am an agent (have a humanity to respect). This is because agents 
are self-conscious beings with the capacity to reason. The most you can know is that I behave 
like an agent. There is no inherent contradiction involved in your claim that I behave like an 
agent but am not one, nor is there a direct contradiction between your claim that you are an 
agent (which you know directly through your own self-consciousness) and your claim that I 
am not an agent (though I behave like one). So, you might contend, the fact that the 
Kantian/Gewirthian argument establishes that you are categorically bound not to torment any 
agent (according to Gewirthians, against the agent’s will) does not categorically require you 
not to torment me. 
 
Korsgaard’s appeal to Wittgenstein does bear on this. Whether or not she can derive ‘I 
categorically must treat those who behave like agents as agents’ from Wittgenstein’s 
argument I will not consider. In any case, I think that this proposition is true. However, my 
justification for this rests on it being dialectically necessary for me to consider that other 
agents have the generic rights. If this is so then when I am confronted by you, and you behave 
like an agent, I can either behave towards you as though you are an agent and treat you as 
having the generic rights or behave towards you as though you are not an agent and not treat 
you as having the generic rights. On the assumption that only I can know with certainty that I 
am an agent, I will not with certainty ever be able to know whether or not I have made a 
mistake, whichever course I choose.  However, I know with certainty that if I assume that 
you are not an agent and I am wrong I have violated the categorical imperative. But, if I 
assume that you are an agent and I am wrong, I have not violated this imperative. Hence, 
provided that I can treat you as an agent (and I can if you have the capacity to behave like 
one, which you demonstrate by my capacity to hear your complaint as a complaint etc.) it is 
dialectically necessary for me to assume that you are an agent.
44
 So, since the dialectical 
necessity for me to accept that you have the generic rights if you are an agent follows 
logically from it being dialectically necessary for me to consider ‘I have the generic rights 
because I am an agent’, there is also no need to appeal to Wittgenstein to establish that I 
categorically must treat you as an agent if you behave like one, even if such an appeal would 
suffice.
45
 
 
Part Five: Why Kantians Ought to be Gewirthians 
 
Kantians hold that action in accord with the PHI is a priori. Kant himself says 
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Whoever wills the end also wills (insofar as reason has decisive influence on his 
actions) the indispensably necessary means to it that are within his power. This 
proposition, as regards the volition, is analytic.
46
 
 
I understand Kant to be saying that if you will an end and act as you ought to act if you are 
instrumentally rational you will necessarily will the means or stop willing the end, which is to 
say that the PHI defines instrumental rationality.  Acting in accord with the PHI does not 
define acting; agents do not necessarily act in accord with it: if they did it could not be an 
imperative. The PHI is dialectically necessary for agents, because acting in an instrumentally 
rational way is dialectically necessary for agents. It is the statement that the PHI is 
dialectically necessary for agents that is analytic.
47
 
 
Jean Hampton’s claim that the PHI is a categorical imperative is consistent with this. 
According to Hampton, even though a reason to pursue some substantial end might depend 
on having a desire, it is not contingent on the desires one has whether or not one is bound to 
act according to the PHI.  So, the authority of the PHI 
 
has to be understood noninstrumentally. Because it is the foundation of the idea that 
we ought to act on means appropriate to the achievement of our ends, it cannot be 
defended consequentially. Thus, understood as an imperative, it is categorical and not 
hypothetical.
48
 
 
But, to repeat, if we combine this with recognition that the GCAs are necessary for the 
pursuit/achievement of an agent’s purposes, whatever they might be, then SROa is a 
categorical imperative for Albert, and if the move to moral obligation is sound (which 
requires the FMP to be categorically binding), then the PGC is categorically binding! 
 
So, how do Kantians (who must agree that the FMP is categorically binding) escape the 
conclusion that the PGC is the categorical imperative? They can do so only by showing that it 
is dialectically necessary for agents to defend their possession of the GCAs not merely 
categorically instrumentally but as ends in themselves. 
 
Korsgaard tells us that her own argument for Stage I
49
 is  
 
just a fancy new model of an argument that first appeared in a much simpler form, 
Kant’s argument for his Formula of Humanity.  He started from the fact that when 
we make a choice we must regard its object as good.  He asked what it is that 
makes these objects good [and] decided that the goodness was not in the objects 
themselves. Were it not for desires and inclinations  we would not find their objects 
good. Kant saw that we take things to be important because they are important to 
usand he concluded that we must therefore take ourselves to be important. In this 
way, the value of humanity is itself implicit in every human choice. If complete 
normative skepticism is to be avoidedif there is such a thing as a reason for 
                                                          
46
Kant, Groundwork 4: 417.   
47
 Of the categorical imperative, Kant says that it connects a ‘volition  immediately with the concept of the 
will of a rational being as such as something that is not contained in it’ (Groundwork 4:420 footnote), so that it 
is a synthetic a priori principle (see 4:445; 4:447). Because the same must apply to the PHI, this implies that 
when Kant says that a normative principle is synthetic a priori he means that it is dialectically necessary. 
48
 Jean Hampton, The Authority of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 140, n. 22. 
49
 See Korsgaard, Sources, pp. 90-130. 
actionthen humanity, as a source of all reasons and values, must be valued for its 
own sake.
50
 
 
Up to a point, I agree. What this does not show is that I must regard myself as important in 
the sense of valuing my continued existence as an agent as an end in itself. The value I must 
attach is to my power to exercise choice, which is non-instrumental because my exercise of 
this power is not a means for me to pursue or achieve my chosen purposes, but makes 
purposes my purposes. But my having this power is not therefore an end that I ought to 
pursue for its own sake, because I necessarily have it when I set any end. Instead, I must 
value the exercise of my power of choice as the supreme authority for my disposal of my 
person, because the necessary valuing of my humanity, being implicit in my every choice, 
subsists in my choosing the purposes I choose to pursue, which might include my choosing to 
end my existence as an agent.  
 
Anyway, Korsgaard does not follow Kant’s interpretation of the idea that one must regard 
one’s humanity as an end in itself. Kant thinks that because one must regard one’s humanity 
as an end in itself, one may not commit suicide for any self-regarding purpose.
51
  On the 
other hand, Korsgaard believes that ‘there can be good reasons for committing suicide’,52 
which are, essentially, to ’preserve your own identity, and to protect the values for which you 
have lived’.53 
 
I agree with Korsgaard; but only because this is exactly what {SROa}Albert entails for Albert. 
 
So, what are we to make of the following statement, made to clarify her position? 
 
The instrumental principle [i.e., the PHI] is not a principle of practical reason that is 
separable from the categorical imperative [because there is only one categorical 
imperative]: rather, it picks out an aspect of the categorical imperative: the fact that 
the laws of our will must be practical laws, laws that constitute us as agents by 
rendering us efficacious. Second, the categorical imperative is not a principle of 
practical reason that tells us to have certain ends, and that is separable from the 
principle that tells us to take the means to those ends.
54
 [My emphasis added] 
 
There can, indeed, be only one categorical imperative. So, the PHI, being categorically 
binding, must be an aspect of the categorical imperative. But, on the one hand, Korsgaard 
seems to be saying that the PHI does not contribute to the content or form of the categorical 
imperative: compliance with it is merely a means for finite agents to put its commands 
(which are determined independently of the PHI) into effect (which is, I think, consistent with 
Kant’s own mistaken view). Yet, on the other hand, she says that the categorical imperative, 
which tells us to have certain ends, is not separable from the PHI. 
 
But, because {PHI}Albert  {SROa}Albert   {PGC}Albert, the PGC must also be inseparable 
from the categorical imperative. That the GCAs are categorically instrumentally necessary for 
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Albert’s purposes provides the dialectically necessary PHI with a dialectically necessary 
substantive content, which entails that the PGC is categorically binding. 
 
That Korsgaard does not think clearly enough about this is also shown by her denial that 
‘moral obligations always trump others’.55 As she insists,56 there can be conflicts between 
one’s personal (non-moral) normative commitments and one’s moral obligations. However, 
as she also appreciates, any actions that ‘are fundamentally inconsistent with the value of 
humanity [i.e., with the categorical imperative] must be given up’.57 But moral obligations 
are those one must accept in order to act consistently with the categorical imperative, which 
renders it incoherent to say that, when one’s moral obligations conflict with rules that one 
contingently chooses to treat as binding, the moral obligations do not take rational priority.  
This is not to say that Albert may not place himself under an obligation to permit Brenda to 
harm him generically. But this is only because the dialectical necessity of SROa (and hence 
of the PGC) does not require Albert to defend his possession of the GCAs from interference 
per se, only from interference that is against his will, and this is because of the dialectical 
necessity of the PHI. Albert has no moral obligation to defend his possession of the GCAs 
from interference that he wills (unless this is to protect the GCAs of another agent from 
interference against that agent’s will).58 But this is only possible because the PHI contributes 
to the form and content of the categorical imperative.
59
 Otherwise, Williams would be right to 
suggest that the idea of a categorically binding impartial imperative leaves nothing ‘in 
particular for me to be’.60   
.  
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that Gewirthians are Kantians in aiming to establish a categorically binding 
impartial principle as being connected entirely a priori with the concept of an agent as such. 
However, in these terms, Albert must consider humanity/agency in his person to be an end in 
itself only if this means that he must consider that he has the generic rights.
61
 Kantians, 
therefore, ought to be Gewirthians. 
 
This is only the beginning of the story about the relationship between Kant’s own position 
and Gewirth’s. For example, questions need to be asked and answered about the relationship 
between the Gewirthian argument for the PGC and Kant’s ‘transcendental deduction’ in 
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Chapter III of the Groundwork and his appeal to the Fact of Reason in Critique of Practical 
Reason; about how Kant and Gewirth, respectively, conceive of the relationship between 
being an agent and being the particular agent that one is; and about the implications of this 
for notions of free-will and determinism, teleology, aesthetics, and God. I hope to pursue 
these systematically in the future.
62
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
.  
 
 
                                                          
62
 I have written about aspects of these topics in, e.g., Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human 
Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) Chapter Five; and Deryck Beyleveld 
‘Morality and the God of Reason’ (Utrecht: University of Utrecht, 2009) (ISBN: ISBN 978-90-7612-95-0). I am 
not completely satisfied with what I have said there; but the issues are too complex to state briefly. 
